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  ABSTRACT  
Agility offers an adaptable and changeable environment within software 
development. The benefits that agile methods provide for software development are 
becoming an even greater possibility in safety-critical software programs. These certified 
programs go through a rigorous process to ensure the safety of all people involved. As the 
systems become more complex and there is a need for adaptability, the benefits of agile 
could save companies considerable time and money without sacrificing the safety factor. In 
this paper, I will provide ways of incorporating certification for highly critical systems by 
using a form of agility tailored to fit certification requirements. With time reduction and an 
increasing  ability to change safety-critical software, it will show that it can be a viable 
option to deploy.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Agile Software Development is a software development methodology that helps 
with a specific need in a changing and dynamic world. The Agile Manifesto was written for 
this specific need to provide an alternative to the multitude of documentation obsessed and 
cumbersome software development processes. The manifesto claims that the following 
principles are preferred over the more traditional software approach. The first principal 
states that the inclusion of various individuals and their close relationships are preferred 
over the use of the many processes and tools that are heavily employed. The next principal 
states that a usable software deliverable is preferred over its all-encompassing 
documentation. The next principal states that there is an emphasis where collaboration and 
the interaction of the customer throughout its development process is more appealing than 
a negotiated contract without further customer interaction. Finally, the principal states that 
the response to various changes throughout the development is preferred over following a 
specific rigid plan. These are all preferred principals over the traditional software 
approaches. These are the principals and standards that make up Agile Software 
Development [4]. These standards can be further broken down to show the following 
objectives. The goal is to make software better. 
The objective of agile is to: 
 Satisfy the customer through timely and continual delivery of a valuable 
software product  
 Changes to any part of the requirements during its work cycle is encouraged  
 At the end of each iteration, a working and usable software is delivered as 
frequently as possible. 
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 Groups of people must work together daily throughout the project and build 
software that is highly relatable and with extensive collaboration  
 All the people involved must always use face-to-face conversation and maintain 
a constant work pace through each iteration.  
 People must provide continuous attention to technical excellence, good design, 
maintaining its simplicity, and increasing the output of quality work. 
 Self-organizing teams must learn how they can become more effective and how 
to continually maintain this behavior. [1] 
Software requirements are described as something that the software has to or is 
required to do. Software requirements sometimes do need to change in real world 
situations. In the course of development, this is not a big surprise and are expected to 
happen. There are multitude of reasons why this happens, and there has to be a way to 
accept this change. The key is to balance these changing requirements with as little impact 
to the software. The idea of continuous and ongoing development is prevalent in an agile 
methodology. Flexibility is an important key in ensuring that all of the customer’s 
requirements are met. Some researchers have found that flexibility can be 
counterproductive and may produce undesirable or uncontrolled changes in the 
requirements known as scope creep. This can therefore cause an undesirable change in the 
project schedule’s time, an increase in cost of the project, and produce an unnecessary risk. 
It has been reported that many companies find that safety-certified software costs roughly 
10 times as much as non-certified software with its equivalent functionality [10]. 
Extreme Programming follows these agile principles. It can provide the strengths of 
agile by making the software lighter and more manageable to work with. It stresses 
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customer satisfaction. It provides software in usable chunks to fit a specific need that is 
vital to a software company. Extreme Programming inspires developers to confidently 
respond to the changing customer requirements, even toward the end of its life cycle. 
Extreme Programming emphasizes teamwork whereas managers, customers, and 
developers, and even users are all equal partners in a large collaborative team. This 
provides a simple and effective environment that enables the teams to become highly 
productive and release reliable software quickly [15]. 
Scrum also follows a very similar agile approach as does extreme programming. It 
includes teams where each particular roles played by a member. Sprints are specific 
durations of development effort and can range from one week to one month. Each sprint is 
preceded by a meeting which is planned with its identified tasks and an estimated and 
specified commitment goal. This is followed by a subsequent meeting, where progress is 
reviewed. Each day during a sprint, a project team meeting occurs and follows a set of 
guidelines where all members are prepared with updates. The meeting lasts for 15 minutes 
in which the location and time are fixed [47].  
In the following study, I will be presenting the various certification needs that are 
located in the common areas of agility used today. The focus will be into molding the 
certification processes into the agile development philosophy while maintaining the focus 
of the safety-oriented environment. 
1.1.    Certification 
Safety-critical software is a type of software that if a failure occurs in the software, 
it will very likely result in the loss or endangerment of human life or the significant harm to 
the surrounding environment. People involved in the development of safety-critical 
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software exercise extreme caution against system failure. Most safety-critical systems are 
closely regulated by government agencies with strict certification requirements. The 
objective of software certification is to provide a solid foundation in obtaining a reliability 
measure of the software and/or its components from failure. For many types of safety-
critical systems, having guidelines that define its processes and objectives for the creation 
of quality software has tremendous value for developers of safety-critical systems [11]. 
1.2.    RTCA DO-178B 
One highly critical software certification guideline that will be discussed is called 
the “The Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification” or 
simply called RTCA DO-178B [12] and is of high critical importance to aviation. RTCA or 
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics is an association of aeronautical 
organizations of the United States of America from both government and industry. This is 
the organization that produces this guideline. The FAA uses the DO-178B as a document 
that provides guidance in determining if the software will perform reliably in an aerial 
setting. DO-178B has become a standard in certified software and is the accepted means of 
certifying all new aviation software [16]. It’s main function and purpose is within the 
development processes. Accordingly, the DO-178B requires the delivery of many 
documents and records. The quantity of documents needed for a DO-178B certification, 
and the amount of information it requires, is determined by the level of certification that is 
requested [13]. DO-178B comes in varying degrees of certification levels starting at Level 
A, B, C, D, and finally E.  Level A is determined to be the most critical. Correspondingly, 
these DO-178B levels describe the consequences of a potential failure of the software: 
catastrophic, hazardous-severe, major, minor, or no-effect; accordingly. The DO-178B 
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certification process is the most demanding at its higher levels. A product certified at a DO-
178B Level A would require the most thorough, labor-intensive preparation to meet these 
strict guidelines. Developers identify the levels of a particular functionality in accordance 
to how critical they are to the survival of the system. They then separate all of the resources 
that require less-critical functionality from the ones that are more critical. Failure of a 
Level-A component is considered to be catastrophic or the continued safe flight of the 
aircraft. Failure of a Level-B component is considered to be hazardous and severe, 
significantly reducing its safety limitations but may not risk the loss of life. Failure of a 
Level-C component is considered to be major, reducing the ability of the crew to do their 
job but not necessarily decreasing the system safety limitations, and Level-D that provides 
little or no safety issues [12]. 
In general, these standards and guidelines serve two purposes. It provides a way for 
the systems that are procured is free from defects that could lose lives. It also provides 
guidelines on how these systems are built, so that they perform exactly to the stakeholders’ 
specifications. Therefore these specifications have been tested to provide the most error 
free system offered. 
 With the most critical (Level A) software, which is defined as that which could 
prevent continued safe flight and landing of an aircraft, it must satisfy a level 
of coverage called the modified condition/decision coverage (MC/DC). It is used in 
the DO-178B to ensure that Level A software is tested adequately. In satisfying the 
MC/DC coverage criterion during testing, all testing conditions must be met at least once 
The following steps must be followed. The first step is that each decision tries every 
possible outcome. This is followed by each condition in a decision takes on every possible 
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outcome. Followed by, each entry and exit point is invoked.  Lastly, each condition in a 
decision is shown to independently affect the outcome of the decision [5]. 
1.3.    System Safety Assessment Process 
The system safety assessment process with the DO-178B determines and 
categorizes the failure conditions of the system. These requirements are designed for both 
hardware and software to prevent or limit the effects of the faults. Its purpose is to provide 
fault detection and/or fault tolerance. It ensures that these safety-related requirements are a 
part of the overall system requirements that form the Software Life Cycle. The system 
requirements in safety-certified software typically include the System Description and 
Hardware Definition; Certification requirements that include Federal Aviation Regulations 
and other required certifications; System Requirements allocated to software, including 
functional, performance, and safety-related requirements; Software Levels and data to 
support their determination; and finally Safety Strategies and design constraints, including 
design methods such as partitioning, dissimilarity, redundancy or safety monitoring [12].   
If the system is a component of another system with those safety related-
requirements and failure conditions for that system, the system safety assessment process 
determines the impact of the software design. It determines the implementation on system 
safety using information provided by the software life cycles [12]. 
1.4.    Failure Conditions 
 The failure condition category of a system is established by determining the 
severity of failure conditions on the aircraft and its occupants. An error in software may 
cause a fault that contributes to a failure condition. Thus the level of software integrity 
necessary for safe operation is directly related to the system failure conditions. The failure 
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condition category of a system is established by determining the severity of failure 
conditions on the aircraft and its occupants. An error in software may cause a fault that 
contributes to a failure condition. Thus the level of software integrity necessary for safe 
operation is directly related to the system failure conditions. 
Failure conditions are categorized as catastrophic where failure conditions would 
prevent continued safe flight and landing. Hazardous/Severe-Major determines that failure 
conditions would reduce the capability of aircraft or the ability of the crew to manage 
adverse operating conditions. This would include a large reduction in safety margins or 
functional capabilities. This would also provide physical distress or higher workload on the 
crew that may result in an inaccurate or an incomplete performance. It would provide 
adverse effects on occupants including serious or possible fatal injuries. Major Conditions 
are failure conditions that cause significant reduction in safety margins or functional 
capabilities. There would be significant increase in crew workload or in conditions 
impairing crew efficiency, discomfort to occupants, and possibly include injuries. Minor 
Conditions are failure conditions which would not significantly reduce aircraft safety. This 
would involve crew actions that can be accommodated by slight increases to their workload 
and within acceptable bounds of efficiency. No effect are failure conditions that do not 
effect the operational capability of the aircraft or increases in workload.  
1.5.    Software Levels 
Software levels are based upon the contribution of software to provide potential 
failure conditions as determined by the system safety assessment process. The software 
level implies that the level of effort required to show compliance with software 
requirements varies with its failure condition. Software Level definitions are as follows. 
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Level A will produce a condition in software whose behavior would cause or contribute to 
a failure of system function resulting in catastrophic failure condition of the aircraft; Level 
B will produce a condition in software whose behavior would cause or contribute to a 
failure of system function resulting in hazardous/severe-major failure condition of aircraft; 
Level C will produce a condition in software whose behavior would cause or contribute to 
a failure of system function resulting in a major failure condition; Level D will produce a 
condition in software whose behavior would cause or contribute to a failure of system 
function but with minor failure condition; and Level E will produce a condition in software 
whose behavior would cause or contribute to a failure of system function with no effect. 
Once software is confirmed as level E, no further guidelines of this document apply [12]. 
Airborne systems and equipment mandated by operating regulations and which do 
not affect airworthiness of the aircraft, for example an aircraft data recorder, the software 
must be appropriate for its intended function. This would mean that a data recorder would 
be required and functioning but is not a safety problem if it malfunctioned. This would fall 
under a legality that would cause monetary damages. If the behavior of a software 
component contributes to more than one failure condition, than the most severe condition is 
taken into account for the software level for that software component [12]. 
 If the system safety assessment process determines that the system architecture 
prevents behavior of the software from contributing to the most severe failure conditions of 
the system, then the software level is determined by the most severe category of the 
remaining failure conditions to which the behavior can contribute. The system safety 
assessment process looks at the architectural design decisions to determine its effect on its 
software levels or software functionality. The following techniques provide several 
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architectural strategies that can limit the impact of these errors and to detect these types of 
errors [12]. 
1.6.    Partitioning 
Partitioning is a technique for providing isolation between functionally independent 
software components to isolate faults and potentially reduce the effort of the software 
verification process. If the software is protected by partitioning, the software level of each 
partitioned component may be determined using the most sever condition category rule of 
thumb. Guidance for designing partitioning protection would be Hardware resources, in 
controlling coupling, data coupling, and the failure modes of the hardware devices that 
associated with these protected mechanisms. Software Life Cycle processes should address 
the partitioning design considerations, including the scope of interactions permitted 
between the partitioned components [12].  
1.7.    Multiple Version and Dissimilar Software 
Multiple version and dissimilar software is a system design technique in which more 
than one component of software that provide the same function in a way that may avoid 
some sources of common errors between components. Dissimilar software versions are 
used as a means of providing additional protection after the software objectives for the 
software level have been satisfied [12]. 
1.8.    Safety Monitoring 
Safety monitoring is a means of protecting against specific failure conditions by 
directly monitoring a function for failures which could contribute to the error condition. 
Through the use of monitoring techniques, the software level of the monitored function 
may be reduced to the level associated with loss of its related system function. To allow 
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this reduction there are important attributes of the monitor that should be determined: The 
software level which the monitor is assigned the most sever failure condition category for 
the monitored function. System Fault coverage ensures that the monitors design and 
implementation are such that the faults it detects can be detected under all necessary 
conditions. Independence of function and monitor ensures that the monitor and protective 
mechanism is not rendered inoperative by the same failure condition that causes the hazard. 
1.9.    System User Modifications 
System user modifications are also considerations in the software development life 
cycle. It has been noted that potential effects of user modifications are determined by the 
system safety assessment process and are used to develop the software requirements, thus 
the software verification process activities. A change that effects the non-modifiable 
software, its protections, or the software boundaries is considered a software modification. 
A modifiable component is a part of the software that is intended to be changed by the user, 
and a non-modifiable component is one that which is not intended to be changed by the 
user. Some systems and equipment may include optional functions which may be selected 
by software programmed options. The option-selectable software functions are used to 
select a particular configuration within the target computer. The guidance that provides 
system considerations are user-modifiable software, system requirements should specify 
the mechanisms which prevent the user modification from affecting system safety while 
being at the same level as the function it is protecting from errors. If the system 
requirements do not provide provisions for user-modification, the software should not be 
modified by the user unless compliance has been implemented. The user should take all 
responsibility for all aspects of the user-modifiable software. Optional-selectable software, 
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when programmed opinions are included, whereby the means should be provided that 
inadvertent selections cannot be made. Commercial-off the shelf (COTS) satisfies 
objectives of the document. If deficiencies exist in the software life cycle data of COTS 
software, the data should be increased to satisfy the objectives of the document [12]. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several resources have researched the strict certification guidelines that are imposed 
in safety-related software [26], [27], [28], [33]. There also has been research on the 
efficiency of producing certified software [29], compatibility and improvement of the 
certification process [30], safety and hazards of safety-critical software [31], and the 
varying degrees of safety-criticality [32]. Certification provides and requires a very large 
need for documentation and traceability that is significantly contrasted to the little or no 
documentation agile methodologies employs [36], [46], as well as verification tools and 
code certification [34]. Incorporating an iterative approach for development of safety-
critical software and safety-critical systems has been a subject of interest for many years 
[52].  
One resource states that the research into suitability and applicability of Agile 
Methods for safety-critical software development is still at an early stage. It also states that 
there is yet to be a successful application of an Agile methodology to a safety-critical 
project as reported in the literature. It was also argued that an iterative and lightweight 
approach of an agile methodology can improve on the development of safety critical 
systems. What it does not do is argue the direct applicability of developing safety-critical 
systems that require certification. The paper focused on the effect of two specific activities 
in Agile Methods: lightening the up-front design of safety-critical system development and 
the iterative development of the software and its safety arguments [8]. Another resource 
states that all Agile practices can be mapped to a DO-178B software development process 
and that agility provides a best practices for safety-critical systems. They also propose that 
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Agile development does not require quick, encompassing change but can be accomplished 
by incorporating Agile methods into the safety-critical process. [37] 
Varying certifications are required for safety-critical systems like aircraft, 
machinery, etc. to help prevent a failure from happening that could cause loss of life or 
damage to the environment.  The following survey from people in the field also points out 
how certification can be adapted into the agile environment while keeping the same 
standards and a failure free software product. 
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3.   SURVEY RESULTS 
A survey was conducted as a Google Doc survey. I became familiar with LinkedIn 
groups that focused on aviation certified software. I asked various people in these groups, 
particularly people that work with DO-178B/C certification to freely answer a survey based 
on agile programming and certified aviation software development. The participants came 
from varying software companies and job descriptions around the world, all commonly 
working on development of certified aviation software. Out of 55 subjects that reported 
their job titles, there were 21 software Engineers, 3 System Engineers, 4  Company Owners 
or Company CEOs’, 2 Upper Management, 7 Quality assurance personnel, 5 Designated 
Engineering Representatives or Certification representatives, 6 Project Managers, 3 
Technical Managers, and 4 support personnel. The following answers are presented from 
each of the following multiple choices. 
3.1.     Develop Safety-Oriented Certified Software 
From a sample of 54 respondents to this question, 47 (85%) responded with “Yes” 
and 7(15%) with “No”. This evidence indicates that most of the respondents are working 
on projects that require some kind of safety-oriented task. Percentage of development that 
is dedicated to actual safety-oriented certified software is shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Safety-oriented Certified Development in 1 Year 
Actual 
Development 
% of people 
responded 
10% 13% 
20% 11% 
30% 6% 
40% 6% 
50% 6% 
60% 6% 
70% 8% 
80% 13% 
90% 9% 
100% 23% 
 
This shows that more than 70% of the time at least half of the respondents, work on 
safety projects during a year lifecycle. It also notes that at least one-quarter of the group 
work less than one-quarter of the time on Safety Software. This information could show 
that they provide support services and are not required to work on actual software in a 
year’s time. This may also show that some of the stakeholders may not actually work on 
any of the software, but provide support duties to these projects. These are some indicators 
that arose out of the answers to this question. 
3.2.     Safety-Oriented Certified Software Development 
 From the survey of 55 respondents; 34 (62%) responded with “aircraft software in 
use during flight”; 1 (2%) responded with “aircraft software not in use during flight”; 6 
(11%) responded with “aircraft software used in conjunction with flight activity”; 3 (5%) 
responded with “software to use for support activities of an aircraft”; 2 (4%) responded 
with “non aircraft software but certified”, 0 responded with “non aircraft software and non-
certified”, and 9 (16%) responded with “Other”. Over half have worked on software that is 
in use during a flight schedule that would necessarily provide circumstances that provide a 
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dangerous situation if the software had failed. This is the audience that needs convincing of 
the possibility of instituting the certification guidelines into an agile environment. 
3.3.     Use of DO-178B 
Of the 55 respondents, 50(91%) responded with “Yes” and 5(9%) with “No”. Most 
respondents use the DO-178B guidelines for certification requirements. This is almost a 
complete sample in the actual use of the guidelines for installing software in their daily 
lives. This is a data sample that provides a perfect basis on looking at specific certification 
needs.  
3.4.     Level of Software 
25 (45%) responded with “Level A: Software whose behavior, could cause or 
contribute to a failure of system function resulting in a catastrophic failure condition for the 
aircraft”; 6 (11%) responded with “Level B: Software whose behavior, could cause or 
contribute to a failure of system function resulting in hazardous/severe-major failure 
condition for the aircraft”; 9 (16%) responded with “Level C: Software whose behavior, 
could cause or contribute to a failure of system function resulting in a major failure 
condition for the aircraft”; 7 (13%) responded with “Level D: Software whose behavior, 
could cause or contribute to a failure of system function resulting in a minor failure 
condition for the aircraft”; 0 responded with “Level E: Software whose behavior, could 
cause or contribute to a failure of system function with no effect on aircraft operational 
capability or pilot workload”; 8 (15%) responded with “Other”.  
Close to half of the respondents develop software in the highest degree of potential 
failure conditions. These are conditions that give a serious look into certification guidelines 
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that will be used in providing an insight into the ability of using agile in a highly restrictive 
environment. 
3.5.     Familiarity with Agile Methodology 
The survey results for this question answered with 40 (73%) responded with Yes 
and 15 (27%) responded with No. Almost ¾ of the people surveyed were familiar with 
Agile to some degree. This provides an understanding of how agile can effect on how 
certification works in their development. 
3.6.    Success with Agility in Developing Safety-oriented Certified Software 
The survey results for this question answered with 16 (31%) that responded with 
Yes and 36 (69%) responded with No. This is an area where I would like to look deeply 
into. If the Agile methodology is being used successfully, are they developing in a less 
safety strict environment?  It was found that 6 out of 16 respondents that provide yes, 
actually develop in a Level A environment. This is significant in that 38% that have been 
successful with agile, developing in the strictest and most safety conscious environment. 
This will be discussed further. 
3.7.    DO-178B Change 
 Out of 50 respondents, 28 (56%) of them responded with “Yes” and 22 (44%) of 
them responded with “No”. This seems to be an area that needs a further study. Almost half 
of each group say that certification can be changed. To what degree and by what 
methodology do they prefer? The DO-178C has been able to accommodate new technology 
changes and different language groups since DO-178B was written in 1992. 
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3.8.    Involvement in Software Planning 
 38 (75%) responded with “Yes” and 13(25%) responded “No”. A majority of 
respondents have provided a software plan in their development objectives. This helps 
provide a basis on the usability of planning out a best practices 
3.9.    Level of Safety-Oriented Software would Benefit from Agile 
 In the following survey, respondents were asked which level of safety-software 
would best benefit from the agile methodology. 11 (20%) responded with “Level A: 
Software whose behavior, could cause or contribute to a failure of system function 
resulting in a catastrophic failure condition for the aircraft”; 5 (9%) responded with “Level 
B: Software whose behavior, could cause or contribute to a failure of system function 
resulting in hazardous/severe-major failure condition for the aircraft”; 10 (18%) responded 
with “Level C: Software whose behavior, could cause or contribute to a failure of system 
function resulting in a major failure condition for the aircraft”; 9 (16%) responded with 
“Level D: Software whose behavior, could cause or contribute to a failure of system 
function resulting in a minor failure condition for the aircraft”; 2 (4%) responded with 
“Level E: Software whose behavior, could cause or contribute to a failure of system 
function with no effect on aircraft operational capability or pilot work load”; 18 (33%) 
responded with “Other”. 1 out of 5 respondents believe that a highly restrictive and 
potentially risky software methodology could benefit from the use of an agile approach. 
This provides evidence that there is a need for a different methodology that can fit into a 
stricter certification environment. 
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3.10. Teams 
26 (56%) responded with “Yes” and 22 (44%) responded with “No”. A greater 
percentage of respondents use teaming during the certified process. Though agile isn’t the 
only process to use teaming, it seems that teaming and group interaction may seem likely a 
serious possibility to pursue for integrating certified software into agile. 
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4. THE SURVEY OPINIONS 
The following survey questions with open-ended answers provide several 
interesting views on how agile may affect safety-oriented certified software. These 
questions help formulate some of the further studies into what can become a better practice 
in the integration of certified software into agile methods. 
4.1.    Change in Software Requirements 
Many of the answers to this question stressed that system level and high level 
requirements must be completely finished, agreed upon and signed off before anything 
else. These requirements also need to be testable. The software should be modular, reusable 
and utilize modeling tools such as UML. This will provide early validation and acceptance 
of its low level requirements that can help in producing repeatability and reproduction of 
the artifact.  
Collaboration between different functional areas of the project and increased 
customer involvement has been stressed as well. System Engineers should take on the 
responsibility of engineering the requirements. They work with the system the most. It had 
also been said that outsourcing should be limited where translation errors tend to make 
things more costly in the long run. All collaboration should be kept in-house where 
problems can be resolved easily and worked over collaboratively. 
The safety and dependability objectives shall be clear, well thought out and highly 
documented in order to minimize the risk of hazardous events. These objectives have been 
proposed as enforceable standards instead of guidelines so that safety and security cannot 
be sacrificed or changeable, which can make agile sometimes harder to implement. 
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Other answers have included that there should be better integration of the 
requirements into the scope or tasks to be performed within the project. It was also 
proposed to define a small set of requirements, then implement and verify the code in 
compliance to those requirements within the DO-178B, which would therefore provide 
significant efficiency improvements and reductions in the re-work, while maintaining 
safety. It was also proposed to write the lower level software requirements while testing. 
Then trace these tests back to the high level software requirements. These higher level 
requirements can meet the goals of agility as well as integrating a much tighter and safer 
program to meet the goals of the project. Define only the top-level system requirements, 
interfaces and requirements for each component. Implement a design of the safety critical 
assurance levels based on an architectural breakdown of critical points.  
Problems that some have said is that a truly iterative incremental methodology is 
seldom used in a safety-oriented environment because of the heavy required use of 
documentation. It also mentioned that low level requirements and mapping to its design is 
tedious in this environment and that there seems to be no fusion of the High Level models 
to the Low level models. 
4.2.  Benefits and Disadvantages of Making Changes in Software Requirements 
Benefits that have come up more than once in the answers were that changes to 
requirements will reduce development time and thus increase the development cycle and 
quality output. The source code is therefore verified and less translation errors would create 
fewer hazards, higher reliability, and less maintenance costs.  
There were comments showing a difficult cultural shift for many customers and 
suppliers to consider new development processes because of the risk of failure in this 
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safety-oriented environment. They also found with the model-based approach, there needs 
to be competent people with the correct tools or they can actually cause more errors. It has 
also been stated that bulky software can produce unused code and a reuse flaw can be a 
costly problem in light of safety restrictions. There has to be thorough understanding of the 
scope or required tasks, and that there should be a well-qualified engineering staff to make 
this successful. 
Other respondents feel that the team can focus on a small number of requirements 
related to its function, and be sure to implement them correctly in a relatively short amount 
of time. Agile should be modified significantly to incorporate all the reviews, tests and 
documentation as you develop the system. This should then produce maintainable system 
documentation. With more iterations, you could catch problems earlier. Velocity tracking 
has been found to be a more effective means of tracking overall progress. Define the 
common scope of the project and further define the second level requirements as you 
develop each component, piece by piece. Then, integrate the safety characteristics into the 
design. This would give more time on upfront analysis. Use newer technology to increase 
communication but do not overuse it. It would also help you write better requirements, 
making sure they are testable and perform these tests at an early stage. Streamline the 
requirements analysis process and reduce extraneous tests and documentation. Provide 
better alignment of delivered software with customer requirements. Benefits to this would 
be fewer hazards, higher reliability, less rework, more sustainable software. This would 
help you find out what works on the hardware much easier and actually see what is being 
built. This would therefore provide a good consistent product. You would therefore break 
down the parts easier while realizing the system better. 
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Other respondents have felt that certain factors can be difficult in requirements 
gathering.   Regression testing for small changes in the code can be significantly costly to 
perform. That it is very hard to use agile in a fixed price situation for a project manager. 
One respondent also said that merging of high level and low level requirements removes 
some of the objectives needed in DO-178B such as traceability and coherency. One flaw in 
basic reusable requirements could be a costly one. Traceability can be easily lost, therefore 
unused code may be injected if streamlined requirements analysis and tests are produced. It 
has been emphasized that more time is used in the conceptual design phase (requirement 
analysis) and that this requires more paperwork. It was also stated that prototyping the 
project from the start may easily lose the overall development focus.  
4.3.    Benefits of Teaming in a Safety-oriented Certified Software Environment 
The opinion that many respondents proposed is to use co-located, cross-functional 
and well-defined teams actively working toward the same goal. There should be the same 
knowledge available to all members. The merging of system and software engineers to 
define and verify requirements should be considered. 
Other considerations include setting specific project roles that would build expertise 
for each person in the project. Develop staging check sheets that would ensure all 
certification issues, checklists, and forms are completed and verified at each stage. It was 
also proposed that teaming should be done not only during the design phase but also for the 
testing phase. Ensure that the stakeholders are aware of all the safety constraints. Small 
well-connected teams should be assigned for the entire development project. These teams 
should be kept together once the project is done because it helps in developing good 
relationships from people that work and know each other. This greatly helps get work done 
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much easier. Make sure there is highly qualified people in the certification process to 
eliminate inadvertent requirements-translation errors. Provide solid training and utilize best 
practices where it is needed. Provide a more efficient documented evidence trail for 
auditors and reviewers. This can include checklists to remember and coordinate with 
others. 
4.4.    Change Certification Process 
Repeated answers from respondents have included an agile-based best practices for 
the certification process. A better development of the low level requirements process has 
been desired. Seamless integration of certification activities and its artifacts into the 
software development life cycle has also been desired. Others have stressed that small 
increments of a software product will be a problem with the workload of documentation. 
Model-Based Development has been thought of as a way of doing providing this. 
Other responses include that some wished guidelines were standards so that each 
activity is clearly prescribed. The DER needs to be involved more in the development 
process as well as more involvement from the FAA. It was found that the means of 
compliance are not well understood by many development members. Making document 
generation more automated is something that respondents feel should be offered. 
Understanding more of the aviation business and good practical engineering sense when 
developing under the DO-178B should be good practice.  
Some respondents felt that certification processes are FAA requirements about how 
software is documented and tested, and that development processes can be any form, this 
can conflict with the FAA regarding strict guidelines on how software is documented and 
25 
 
tested. Inconsistent expertise and the judgment of different FAA Aircraft personnel have 
been found that hinders the production of a better product.  
4.5.    Successful with Agile 
Prototyping, and traceability tools, as well as best practices for least critical projects 
were commented more than once. Best practices were found to work on the least critical 
projects by testing the system safety throughout its project cycle. It was stated that Design 
and Coding stages can easily be agile during each applied iteration within the DO-178B 
Guidelines. Requirements in phases allows more flexibility in building software 
incrementally. The development of milestones into the project where each milestone is 
divided into a set of sprints were proposed. Early validation with customers and strong 
cooperation from the software verification team will help eliminate scope creep and keep 
the project on schedule. Break down the development cycle as much as possible into 
smaller pieces that can be accomplished into 1 cycle. It was proposed that tracing should be 
done at end of the cycle or beginning of next. Presentation of code separated from the 
underlying code while allowing rapid changes and eliminating the disturbance of the 
certified code has been proposed. 
Many feel that a concern is that the certifiable life cycle data makes the process 
heavy and there tends to be the lack of design data by auditors. Complex software prevents 
the refactoring of your design at every step. Writing tests first does not necessarily help you 
discover what the system is supposed to do. 
4.6.     Agile Tools and Techniques 
The following techniques and tools give an insight into many of the ways that 
safety-certified software can be integrated into agile. Unit testing was a tool that was highly 
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used as an answer to the question. Others have stated that Unit testing can be done to gain a 
better sense that the code is correct and can form a starting point for Verification and 
Validation. It also was said that Unit testing in a model-based scenario helps find errors 
early in the development phase and ensure robustness of the low-level requirements. Pair 
programming is believed by many to increase knowledge output and that its good when 
you are working out a difficult problem. Peer-reviews were also considered as an 
alternative to pair-programming. Continuous integration was considered very beneficial 
and allowed some organizations to respond to customer delivery changes easier. It cut the 
software build off by a few weeks and provided the product to customer earlier. It also was 
known to help ensure system risks were minimized.  One subject stated that regulations do 
not allow for this technique and that since each software release must be certified, there is 
significant overhead to produce this. 
Design Patterns were another tool that many have used. Design patterns can reduce 
intermediate development tasks and complexity. It does not necessarily help solve your 
problem if you don’t understand the problem. 
Test driven development was used highly as well. It is a good method in the sense 
of writing automated or manual test cases in parallel , but not if the requirements are not 
written. One respondent stated that requirements are the intentional view, and tests are the 
verification view. The two cannot be transformed from one to the other without loss. There 
are requirements that can never be fully tested. And in most cases, no set of tests 
completely specifies the intent of the system. It only allows us to know when we've broken 
previously written code. 
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Code factoring was used but some felt that there were diminishing returns at some 
point and from a practical standpoint of the regulation overhead being so great, that it was a 
costly process that would rarely be given its ability to work. 
4.7.     Comments 
Respondents mentioned that there were no clear definitions for various decisions 
and the DER usually makes their own decisions as to what is acceptable. It was proposed 
that a “Survey of the Pro/Cons” for specific technique concepts of agile development needs 
to be developed, with a specific definition of each one. Solid documentation is still the best 
way to communicate the work products required for certification. Once the Systems 
Engineer can define the requirements accurately, the software programmer can usually 
implement the functionality. Some have also mentioned that the agile development process 
eliminates some of the check points and redundancies, making the development faster but 
at the cost of safety. It has been stressed that there is an ability to selectively pick positive 
facets of each methodology and mold each together would be something of consideration 
to the aviation community. 
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5. RESEARCH APPROACH 
Software for airborne systems and their equipment gives the aviation community an 
acceptable level of confidence. It assures that the software being built, complies with 
airworthiness requirements set forth by the Federal Aviation Administration. As software 
in the field of safety becomes more complex and the technology to help alleviate these 
safety problems become more developed, there needs to be a foundation to help fix these 
concerns. The following are strategies that will be employed to integrate the safety-
certified constraints into an agile approach. 
As shown in the DO178B, the certifier has a goal. It is to produce software within 
its safety guidelines and conform to FAA restrictions. The certifier’s objective is to 
produce the most error free product as possible. His stake in all this is to make sure it 
conforms to safety measures. The applicant’s role or aptly named as “stakeholder” is to 
produce a safe product that keeps the software’s focus. He in turn needs to maintain its 
livelihood well after the product is installed. Neither the certifier nor the stakeholder wants 
the software to fail. The stakeholder has monetary goals where he wants to produce a 
sustainable source of profit. If one failure happens, they both have lost their integrity and 
their intended goal. Both stakeholder and certifier needs to come to an agreement on how 
to produce a product that everyone can be pleased with [12]. 
In this thesis, I will provide is a process that will incorporate this certification 
process.  Safety-secure software is very document heavy so there has to be traceability if a 
failure arises. This follows a close modified version to extreme programming and is used 
during the planning of a certified release.  
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Below [figure 2] shows the certification model (as follows) for the development 
process of certification that I envision. Each work item will have a corresponding chapter 
and provides details on how to integrate each of the sections. 
Figure 1. Certification Model 
5.1.    Pre-Planning and Initial Phase 
The first stage would be the pre-planning and initial phase. The following will show 
steps on how to complete this. 
Step 1:  The first thing to start is to provide a preliminary idea.  In aviation, this is 
the software that controls or works in conjunction with an aircraft. In this software 
example, it will be a new autopilot software module designed for a new aircraft that 
performs roll and pitch that is controlled by the aircraft fly-by-wire system. This idea or 
inception has to be approved and the expenditures available by the stakeholder. 
Step 2: Who do I need to accomplish this? This is to be initiated by the Project 
manager or equivalent. The first set of people to start this process would be the "Lucky 7" 
or seven “key” personnel to the project. These seven ideal personnel would provide a 
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meaningful discussion and begin the “initial process”. Seven personnel would provide a 
significant voting decision in case of a tie if there needs to be a majority “vote”. 
These seven personnel will come from a mixed group of people associated with the 
software project. These people will be involved in a standard sit down meeting to go over 
the feasibility of the project. This is called a "round-up" where the team is initiated and 
they are to be contacted personally. It’s easier to use technology to contact people but 
phone calls and email would not necessarily get as definitive answer as a meeting one on 
one.  This would ensure that they are clearly advised and that they understand their duties. 
Let them know specifically what the "job" will encompass and that they will agree to it. 
Get a whole-hearted complete agreement that they will attend and that they provide the 
needed help in this endeavor. If all people are not 100% on board, this project has failed 
from the start. They have to agree to attend and provide constructive output. 
 People that should be involved are as follows: Two developers that will be working 
throughout the project. These people should be the main developers of the project. It should 
preferably contain one senior developer and one developer that has experience with the 
intended software.  Include one head DER (designated engineer representative from FAA) 
that certifies or manages the certification process for the software and one other certifier 
that will be the main certifier for the software (preferably a DER). These certifiers will be 
included in all decisions in the software concept. 
 We need to include the head of the company or division, preferably the head overseer 
of the project. He will be considered the Stakeholder that will be paying for or determines a 
need for the software. He has to be the one to provide the development funds, not a 
representative. He needs to be an integral piece of these meetings. I would include one 
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highly knowledgeable pilot that has a basic understanding of software development. He 
would be considered the user and knows more about the use of the software and how he 
interacts with it.  He is the one that will be at risk of failure andwill be in harm’s way if a 
potential failure exists. The pilot may provide better ideas on how to reduce that risk. This 
gives the developers a “face” to see when they develop. 
 Last and most important, one head project manager should be included who will be 
the meeting leader and planner. This will most likely be the leader of the project that 
oversees the project to completion. This person can be the project manager for the software 
or a manager that has experience in the software process. This person will be making most 
of the calls to gain support for the project. All seven of these people are key players in the 
project and have an equal standing when it comes to getting the software off the ground. 
 The next step is to provide a convenient location to hold the “round-up” for the 
preliminary meeting and for subsequent meetings. These following best practices are 
preferred in following an agile plan. No telecommuting will be permitted except for 
feedback reasons. All preparation work is to be done together in close and comfortable 
quarters. Provide a room big enough to hold a group of people that are ready to work. All 
necessary equipment must be ready to use and in working order. A whiteboard for 
storyboarding is preferred. One that is easily cleaned and easy to see for all people. The use 
of electronic whiteboards or mobile applications are acceptable. Electronic whiteboards can 
be easily wiped and provide excellent ways in producing an electronic copy. Touch tablets 
will work for this, they are easily accessible and provide multitude of specific, easy 
applications that help present your thoughts and ideas. Refreshments (enough to make the 
meeting comfortable and help in providing productive decisions) are preferred. People are 
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more comfortable when coffee and light food is present. Prefer foods that provide 
sustainability during long periods of time. Foods with high protein help with brain use. 
Soft, comfortable chairs provides good posture for productive work. 
 Step 3:  Provide a team atmosphere. If people do not know each other, introduce 
them. If there are personal differences, put them aside and develop for the advancement of 
the product. All people need to have a stake in this software to make it work. DERs need to 
be involved and provide constructive assistance. Understand each other’s role, and provide 
a good work setting for all involved. The User (as in this instance) will be a pilot that will 
be doing his job with the benefit of the software installed into his plane or others like it. 
Provide this person with an understanding of what they will do. Provide a clear cut and 
"simple" plan when it comes to the first of the requirement stages. Everyone is equal when 
sitting down to provide ideas. Everyone has a place in this development. 
 Step 4: Develop plans that can be decided on and will work. Bring all your best 
people together into the Initial Planning Phase and hash out these ideas together until 
finished.  Include all certification personnel that are relevant to the production of this 
software. Make sure they are included and that they come to this initial planning meeting.  
  Make use of “time-boxed” sessions. Work as long as you are useful. Take 20 minute 
breaks every 90 minutes. Finish certain goals every 90 minutes. Use these breaks to clear 
your thoughts. If the work is not going anywhere, stop and reconvene the following day 
with a fresh start after a “time-box is finished. Useful work is everything. Make sure that 
all needed personnel are present or a knowledgeable person can be used in place of the 
absent team member. Keep a "backup” person available to convene when one member 
cannot be present. They must have the same knowledge and understanding of the problem. 
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They need to know exactly what their colleagues are working on and what has been 
accomplished. This would mean that replacements for current personnel should be 
considered an easy replacement. These replacement personnel will be informed and have 
the knowledge to pick up where the other member left off. Any meeting information should 
be relayed to the backup person. The teams should be transparent when sitting down to 
finalize the requirements. 
 Certification needs can be achieved by these following steps. The certifier is 
detrimental in this stage. With research of these agile practices, I have found that the area 
of certification in agile methods can be expanded further and produce better results to 
maintain safety-oriented standards.  
5.2  Utilizing the User Stories 
 Setup user stories and pinpoint where certification is to be included. The certifier 
needs to be a major force in the work of designing. Make pin points to where these 
certification points are needed. Grade these pinpoints by color such as severe risk, high 
risk, medium risk, low risk (Red, Yellow, Green, or White) or any combination that seems 
fitting to the organization. Refactor these pinpoints to provide the best outcome and easiest 
route to get reliable and safe software with all required certifications included. These 
stories [14] should have a time attached as to what is required to complete one story. The 
stories are to be broken into tasks. This will force you into finding how to approach that 
particular story. This will show you how to revise before making a new step.  
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Figure 2. User Storyboard using Corkulous (Ipad) 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Example User Story 
How to develop the aircraft yoke using user stories: 
 Write user stories in “As a <type of user>, I want <some goal> so that <some reason>” 
[6]. Check to see if user story can be incorporated with certification.  
 Place check marks for certification. 
Aircraft Yoke on fly-by-wire system: 
 
1. Pilot will utilize FA/18 aircraft and position himself at controls. 
2. Pilot will start specific controls in use of aircraft. 
3. Controls will initialize for FA/18 aircraft. 
4. Pilot will start flight. 
5. Set degree change for roll and pitch based on flight environment 
6. Level out and bring controls back to 0. 
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 Put all user stories contributed from team members onto whiteboard. 
 Include user roles to these stories on the storyboard. 
 Throw out any user story that does not fit into any of the requirements. If one fits but 
MAY be utilized at some point, place it in a "Decision pile".   
 When all Stories are presented, rate the decision pile and put up the ones that work the 
best.  
 Incorporate certification into these stories. Use a whiteboard to "stick" these stories. 
Place the "pins" where they would fit the best or are required to support the level of 
safety that would give the best advantage in safety and development time. If color pins 
can’t be used, just rate level of certification severity. Provide a conservative percentage 
on how much certification would be required for each story. 
 Satisfy the percentage and reason for the certification percentage into the story. 
 Average each color or severity level and determine the pin (level’s) group’s 
certification percentage and get a total percentage of how much certification can be 
determined for each grouping. Determine cost by each of these groupings, dependent 
by the cost of certification. 
 If a user story has a non-safety certified requirement, see if this part needs to be 
certified. If safety is a factor, determine the severity of this story, and work around it. 
Highlight the best avenue, ensuring the utmost safety. Utilize the complexity ratio in 
Chapter 5.2.1 
 Break each story down to the smallest chunk that can be written out.  
 Story boards need to be "feasible" or “doable”. If they are not, the user story must be 
eliminated or be formatted into an understandable story. 
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 Place user stories with their corresponding certification pins in a work pile.  
 Can these be refactored to not include certified pins? Can the pins be set as white or 
determined as no safety factor needed? Can these stories be eliminated if needed? 
Provide a Time to accomplish each story. Each story point should approximate to 3 
weeks. 
 Check previous story points based on equivalent stories depending on the current 
personnel's skill. Make sure it is as accurate as possible.  
 If no previous estimates are used, use a spike or what is considered quick exploration of 
the issue. 
 Split a story if it can be split into smaller stories. This should be done if a story is 
extremely large and difficult to estimate. Make sure the new stories cover the original 
completely. 
 From these stories, we should provide steps that will therefore be put into low level 
requirements. 
5.2.1   Certification Complexity Ratio 
 This complexity ratio gives a basis to verify if the story project is complex or not. It is 
not as complex if you have more resources such as people or the lower safety level and will 
lower based on this. It will provide how many certification personnel to be used in 
certifying software. This will help in determining how many certified personnel should be 
available during the story point inclusion to make an agile process easily adaptable. The 
more severity level of certification the more certifiers should be available to use in 
certifying the software. 
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Severity Level Multiplier: 
Level A- 4 most severe 
Level B- 3 medium severity 
Level C- 2 low severity  
Level D –1 non severe 
story points = p 
severity level= l  
certified representatives = r 
complexity ratio = c 
(
p
100) l
r
= 𝑐 
Certification Complexity ratio 
Examples: 
2 Story Points being used 
Level A software project (most severe) 
3 full time certifiers 
Complexity ratio: (2/100)(4) /3= 0.03 
 
With only 2 full time certifiers 
Complexity ratio (2/100)(4) /2 = 0.04 
 
With Level A to B 
Complexity ratio (2/100)(3) /3= 0.02 
 
 In the example, subtracting 1 certification representative which provides full duties to 
the user story, the complexity will increase to 1/100. You will not want to limit the amount 
of certifiers at that “complexity”. If you can reduce the certification level to a Level B, the 
story point load will lower the complexity to 2/100. As from this exercise there seems that 
with more points or safety severity, it will produce a much higher ratio that could impact 
the project.  
5.3.   Release Plan 
 Move each certification user’s story to its own iteration of 1 to 3 weeks based on its 
severity level. Use the certification complexity ratio. These are “time-boxed events” or 
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“spikes”. Make sure that the user story is checked off with a certification team at this time. 
Place each certification story in an iteration with the same level of severity. Attach each of 
these stories where they fit and connect. Base how many stories to be utilized based on 
how many programmers are available to do each story point. Each iteration should end 
with some prototype or product with certification levels set.  
 Below shows the iteration levels as they should be prioritized by the type of 
certification level. This model is based on Ambler’s prioritized model as shown below [3]. 
It shows exactly how to add work items based on the amount of personnel needed and how 
critical the software can be. The more certified personnel should be provided for the higher 
criticality, thus the iterations should include the priority of the highest critical work item. 
These can be added or removed from the stack at any time, and stories are re-sorted to 
provide for these exceptions. 
 
Figure 4. Managing Work as a Certified Stack. 
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5.4     Iterations 
 The Design and Coding stages are produced through 3 week iterations of stories. How 
many iterations is dependent on the story load. These iterations must deliver running, 
tested, integrated software. That means the certification has to be integrated and modified 
to fit into the software process. The software also needs to adhere to strict testing before it 
gets applied to the shelf or added as a usable iteration of the software. Life Cycle data or 
requirements can be produced from the acceptance tests. Certification has to be adapted 
while being dependent on the safety reliability and by what software safety ratio it 
produces. Place a risk factor based on (Severity- 4 for high severity, 3 for medium severity, 
2 for low, 1 for non-severe). Include certified personnel at specified work times when 
certified user stories will be iterated. 
 Iterate all Stories that have a safety work level that are equal or lower than the highest 
safety severity. Each certified iteration checks the story of highest magnitude. Its narrows 
down each certified iteration down to one iteration cycle. It may take longer to satisfy 
conditions for certification than non-certified stories. Remain within the 3 week cycle 
period to keep things running smoothly. If more certified hands are to be used, then 
account for them. Do not wait to finish other stories. Proceed with the other stories that 
need work. Have them accepted before the certification is finished. Finish an iteration 
while the certification iteration is waiting. Keep focus on the level of safety used in the 
certification stories. Higher levels get more emphasis than the other stories. If stories can 
be broken down into smaller non-certified pieces, do it. Keep the severity at the lowest 
denominator. 
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Figure 5. Certified Code Blocking 
5.5.     Acceptance Tests 
 Acceptance tests should be run concurrently using each story. Test around boundaries. 
Try several numbers (above, below, on or close to boundary number) while testing all 
conditions. Story card using title test with a description of the test. Separate test cards to 
utilize for certification testing. Utilize tests that are critical for all certification stories. 
Develop stories with constraints. Run acceptance tests at regular intervals that are expected 
to be implemented at the end of the iteration. Make a special graph of certification 
acceptance testing. Verify that all tests are run. Make aware to all team members which 
tests failed. Dependent on the risk evaluation of the test, will then determine if certification 
will continue. Put a special section on the cork board for constraints. QA is a needed part of 
these tests. Include Certification personnel into the QA team when certification of user 
stories are needed. 
5.6.   Integration Testing 
 Integrate all user story iterations into the complete release with the inclusion of 
certification. Dedicate two embedded testers (one developer and one certification personnel 
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(DER)) to oversee the testing of  the integrated software and then hand it over to the 
stakeholder as completed. 
5.7.    Initial Release and Post-Mortem 
 Once the release is given to the customer, gather constructive feedback from all 
people involved in the project. Rate these feedback responses. Keep them for the next 
release plan. With this feedback, provide a Do’s and Don’ts after the first release. This will 
be used in pre-planning before the next process. Add certification concerns in the feedback 
from certification personnel. Put this altogether to provide a baseline for future work. 
5.8.    Moving Certification into Agile Practices 
Certification can be moved into agile with gradual steps. The consensus is that the 
avionics certification culture is hard to change. As Chenu [22] explained, “This is why we 
have a practice of XP tailored to our industry. The values and principles of XP remain 
perfectly compatible with safety issues. However some practices need to be adapted.” 
The following areas of development can be gradually moved into agile 
development. Requirements are a dilemma in certification because of the size and amount. 
Chenu [22] notes, “Requirements and traceability are an issue, so we’ve added the 
continuous traceability practice. As we work, we record the traceability links. Full 
traceability is continuously and automatically consolidated, quantified, checked and finally 
published.” This helps in the safety analysis process. One respondent of the survey replied, 
“Adopt a very thin requirements hierarchy, concentrating on testable low-level 
requirements and eliminating intermediate layers…that capturing requirements in 
specification tools like display design tools, bus design tools, etc…reviewing and verifying 
them within these tools”. One other respondent said that “repeatability is important since 
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once the design is approved, reproducing the exact artifact is important.” Chenu [22] also 
notes, “Documentation must be considered as part of the product. Therefore, the documents 
must be incrementally written to be potentially shippable after each iteration.” 
Teaming has already been found to help in several instances during safety-oriented 
development and some respondents say they are used in the conventional development of 
certification software. Experienced Developers and the gradual lack of motivation to work 
on large, long-lasting projects, seems to have its share of problems [22]. Extreme 
Programming helps because it enforces training while you work with multidisciplinary 
teams and working in pairs that seem to increase the likelihood of experience gain [22]. 
Teamwork, team spirit and self-organizing teams help to ensure the human element [22]. 
Teaming can be incorporated anytime into the certification process with less restrictive 
development processes first to help plan a more seamless inclusion and that if failure exists 
will not pose an immediate danger.  
Nowhere is there evidence that shows in the DO-178B, that there is a “preferred” 
method of development within the guidelines of the DO-178B. This was proposed by 
several responses in the survey. With cost being shown that it can be sometimes 10 times 
the cost of developing under DO178B than a regular software project, it could help provide 
a cost savings that would make this beneficial. It has been discussed, that the required 
documentation for certification can hinder the use of agile. It has been mentioned that 
checklists and development tools can help the requirements gathering process. It can make 
it much easier to implement other areas of agile such as iterations and testing. K. Nils 
mentioned, “DO-178B guidelines do not allow individual software components to be 
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certified. Only the complete system, which is typically integrated from many independently 
developed components, can be safety certified” [10]. 
Test Driven Development is another section of development that needs focus and to 
slowly integrate it into the certification process. Write code only after a failed unit test for 
that code. The tests always come first and it fails either by code not being written or does 
not contain the logic to successfully work [25]. Vuori [23] says “that tests will remain in 
place during implementation and they will remain as a safety net for refactoring. The 
development of a feature will not be considered “ready” until all the tests pass." 
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6.   EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION 
Certified software has the ability to utilize several aspects of Agile where it can be 
accepting of changes to the software and the use of newer techniques in getting the 
software delivered quickly. It incorporates the agile ideal where certifiers are ingrained into 
the full software process. They become more of a team than thought previously. They have 
a more hand in how things are done and have a better look at the software throughout the 
process.  
The problems that can arise from utilizing the certifiers on a more transparent basis 
is that the resources may not be budgeted for that year. It was found through one study that 
certification under the DO-178B standard adds at least 25 - 40 percent to total project costs, 
and it can climb as high as 75 - 150 percent [50]. This alone would increase exponentially 
if we added more certifiers to a project or take certifiers away from other work. The 
increased resources would most likely double when utilizing a certifier full-time to the 
project. This can cost up to 3 times the cost of an uncertified project. On the other hand, 
these resources can be recouped from a shorter production timeframe in producing a 
working deliverable and the changes that can be instituted at any time during the software 
cycle. Because of this, the project will be shorter and it will provide the ability for the 
certifier to work on the next project and dedicate that time to it. The amount of projects 
completed by the certifier will be much higher in a year’s time. This would increase the 
certifier’s productivity. The benefits producing safety-critical certified software may come 
from a timely software position in a market saturated with software duplication. Software 
changes that come from new advances in the field can be added at various times to the 
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software release being developed. In several ways, these agile changes can provide benefits 
that can outweigh the negative aspects. 
Several respondents had felt that agile should be merged into the certification 
process of safety-oriented development instead of the traditional waterfall methods.  There 
has been a lot of developers from the survey that worked in some capacity in all risk levels 
and utilized many of the agile methods in the certification arena of safety-oriented 
development. It was also stressed that the DO-178B was not designed to mitigate one 
developmental methodology over the other. It stressed guidelines on how to certify these 
highly risky software programs. A lot of the feelings from the survey for agile 
development, came from the cost of time delays in a competitive workplace. They also felt 
that software program doesn’t have to freeze at every step along the way to completion 
before accomplishing anything else. Many others, felt that communication was a key part 
of accomplishing a software project either by groups or by individual interaction. Many felt 
that the communication in the waterfall methods of certification was sometimes lacking.  
Other aspects of Agile that didn’t seem to fair well with respondents were the lack 
of documentation that certification surely needs for verifying its accurateness. I found in 
the survey that it is not the lack of documentation that is the key issue that agile seems to 
eschew, but the efficient use of it. Traditional standards tend to keep documentation around 
just because it was written somewhere that it was required. The main focus of agile is to 
streamline the use of documentation but not completely ignore it. I found that many 
respondents agree with the use of tools or specific guidelines in the retention of these 
artifacts. Once the artifacts are no longer used, they are discarded for new updated 
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versions. Documentation tools or automation can complete this removal of documents and 
artefacts that may pile up during the developmental process.  
  Therefore, I have provided a look into new ways of making certified software more 
agile by adding certifiers at key times during the process. I have added some respondents 
advice in how agile can work in this environment. They have given much insight on what 
works with agile and what will need to be modified for it to work. 
  
47 
 
7.    SUMMARY OR CONCLUSIONS 
The goals that were achieved during this study was to determine if certification can 
be inducted into agile development. As provided from my insight into the problem, 
certification for software will likely need more certification experts on a full-time basis and  
need a hands on approach. This involvement will surely provide more support overhead but 
will ultimately produce shorter time in producing a software product.  One source has said, 
“such practices applied on a large scale DO178B level-A project have enabled us to 
measure encouraging results. The cycle-time has been reduced from one year to 20 days. 
Nine incremental versions have been delivered on schedule to the customer in a 3-year 
time-frame”. Other sources have seen similar reductions in time from the conception to 
each incremental version. 
I see the merger to be a success in several areas in the development process. The 
main issue that can be derived from fully integrating the agile process is in the use of 
documentation. Documentation is very heavy in safety-oriented software and is very much 
needed for its “checks and balances” when it comes to verifying the failure along the 
development process that could result in detrimental catastrophe. Where I see the change is 
in how documentation is used and collected. This is an area that I feel would help benefit 
the safety development process in finding new ways of making documentation fit more into 
an agile philosophy.  I believe there can be more work to be done in that area that can help 
progress the time to develop safety-oriented software or cutting down the redundancy in 
certification. 
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DEFINITIONS 
Aircraft fly-by-wire system: A fly-by-wire (FBW) system replaces the manual flight 
control of an aircraft with an electronic interface. The movements of the flight controls are 
converted into electronic signals transmitted by wires. Flight control computers determine 
how actuators should move at each control surface to provide the expected response. 
Commands from the computers also work without the pilot’s knowledge in stabilizing the 
aircraft and in performing other tasks [7].  
Applicability: Tests designed in support of a team that while delivering software from a 
business perspective ensures that the right product is built. 
Artifact: One of many kinds of tangible products produced during the development of 
software such as use cases, class diagrams, UML models, requirements and design 
documents 
DER (Designated Engineering Representative): an individual, appointed in accordance 
with 14 CFR § 183.29 or job specification of Designated engineering representatives [20], 
who holds an engineering degree or equivalent, possesses technical knowledge and 
experience, and meets the qualification requirements of order 8100.8D : Designee 
Management Handbook [19]. DER may be appointed to act as a Company DER and/or 
Consultant DER. Company DERs can act as DER for their employer and may only 
approve, or recommend approval, of technical data to the FAA for the company. 
Consultant DERs are individuals appointed to act as an independent (self-employed) DER 
to approve or recommend approval of technical data to the FAA [12]. 
Feasibility:  An analysis and evaluation of a proposed project to determine if it is 
technically feasible, within estimated cost, and profitable. Feasibility studies are almost 
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always conducted where large software projects are at stake. Also called a feasibility 
analysis. 
High Level Requirements (HLR): High-level requirements are produced directly through 
analysis of system requirements and system architecture. Usually, these high-level 
requirements are further developed during the design process, thus producing one or more 
successive, lower levels of requirements. [12]. 
Low Level Requirements (LLR): Low-level requirements are software requirements from 
which source code can be directly implemented without further information [12]. 
Traceability: Traceability is about understanding how high-level requirements -- 
objectives, goals, aims, aspirations, expectations, needs -- are transformed into low-level 
requirements. It is therefore primarily concerned with the relationships between layers of 
information. It is also used to follow the life of a requirement, in both forwards and 
backwards directions starting at its origins, through the development and specification 
process, to its deployment and use [9]  
Test Driven Development: Test Driven Development (TDD) is a type of practice, where 
test are developed for a feature or other task before there is a design or implementation [23] 
Validation: Involves checking that the program as implemented meets the expectations of 
the customer [2]. 
Velocity Tracking: A measurement of the amount of selected story cards as long as the 
estimated developer weeks on the cards add up to the number of available developer weeks 
for an iteration [17]. 
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Verification:  Involves checking that the program conforms to its specification without 
execution, This effort may be either informal (using a checklist) or formal (by using a 
proof) [2].  
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APPENDIX. SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Safety-Oriented Certified Software Development requires many guidelines to ensure the 
safety of the public and property in case of failure. Agile development is a collaborative 
and adaptive form of software development. Can we take agile development and integrate 
it into a safety-oriented certified development without sacrificing any of the safety and 
failure rates? PLEASE ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS HONESTLY AND 
PROFESSIONALLY 
What company do you work for?  
How many people are approximately employed in the company you work for? 
What is your company's line of work? 
What is your present position? 
Do you develop any safety-oriented certified software?  
 Yes 
 No 
What safety-oriented certified software do you develop?  
 aircraft software in use during flight 
 aircraft software not in use during flight 
 aircraft software used in conjunction with flight activity 
 software to use for support activities of an aircraft 
 non aircraft software but certified 
  non aircraft software and non-certifed 
 Other:   
 
How much of your development is dedicated to actual safety-oriented certified 
development in a single year? Percentage %   
Do you use the DO-178B for any of your certification guidelines?  
 Yes 
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 No 
What Level would you classify your software if potential failure conditions would present 
itself? The Failure Condition Categorization defines the failure conditions in the DO178B 
(Page 7)  
 Level A: Software whose behavior, could cause or contribute to a failure of system 
function resulting in a catastrophic failure condition for the aircraft. 
 Level B: Software whose behavior, could cause or contribute to a failure of system 
function resulting in hazardous/severe-major failure condition for the aircraft. 
 Level C: Software whose behavior, could cause or contribute to a failure of system 
function resulting in a major failure condition for the aircraft. 
 Level D: Software whose behavior, could cause or contribute to a failure of system 
function resulting in a minor failure condition for the aircraft. 
 Level E: Software whose behavior, could cause or contribute to a failure of system 
function with no effect on aircraft operational capability or pilot workload. 
 Other:   
Of the software life cycle process, which part of development are you active in 
(Requirements, Design, Coding, Integration, or other (explain)) ?   
If you could change any of the certification process, what would it be? What Development 
method would you use? EXPLAIN 
Agile Development and Safety-Oriented Certified Development 
Agile Software Development is a software development methodology that tackles the 
dynamic and ever changing environment. The Agile Manifesto was written as a specific 
need for an alternative to documentation driven, heavy-weighted software development 
processes. The inner workings of the manifesto prefers certain principals but are not 
exclusive. The manifesto claims that individuals and interactions are preferred over 
processes and tools. Working software is preferred over comprehensive documentation. 
Customer collaboration is preferred over contract negotiation. Responding to change is 
preferred over following a specific plan. 
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Certifications are required for certain safety-critical systems like aircraft, machinery, etc. in 
that if a failure happens it could cause loss of life or damage to the environment. The 
iterative cycles, little documentation, more personal interaction, and the development of 
little pieces of workable software may seem to be a difficult task to accomplish in which 
certification is required. My objective is to see how much certification can be utilized using 
an agile approach to development.  
Are you familiar with Agile Development?  
 Yes 
 No 
Have you been successful in using Agility in any of your safety-oriented certified software 
activities?  
 Yes 
 No 
If you have been successful with Agility, what steps were taken and how well did it work? 
EXPLAIN   
 
Do you feel the DO-178B guidelines can be changed without sacrifice to safety and 
security?  
 Yes 
 No 
Requirements analysis can be a long and difficult process where delicate people skills are 
needed to build the software to the specifications of the stakeholder. What would you 
change in the requirements of a certified software development without sacrificing security 
and safety?   
With the changes in Software requirements as you previously stated, what would you 
believe to be the benefit? What would be the disadvantage?   
Are you involved in any of the Software Planning using the DO-178B guidelines?  
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 Yes 
 No 
If you are involved in software planning, which part?   
What level of safety-certified software WOULD YOU FEEL would benefit the greatest in 
an Agile approach? See definitions of Levels in previous question  
 Level A: Software whose behavior, could cause or contribute to a failure of system 
function resulting in a catastrophic failure condition for the aircraft. 
 Level B: Software whose behavior, could cause or contribute to a failure of system 
function resulting in hazardous/severe-major failure condition for the aircraft. 
 Level C: Software whose behavior, could cause or contribute to a failure of system 
function resulting in a major failure condition for the aircraft. 
 Level D: Software whose behavior, could cause or contribute to a failure of system 
function resulting in a minor failure condition for the aircraft. 
 Level E: Software whose behavior, could cause or contribute to a failure of system 
function with no effect on aircraft operational capability or pilot workload. 
 Other:   
Team Composition is usually cross-functional and self-forming without any corporate 
hierarchy or roles in Agile. Do you presently use teams in any of the facets of the certified 
process?  
 Yes 
 No 
With teaming, do you feel it would be beneficial in a safety-oriented certified software 
environment? Why?   
Do you use any of these Agile tools and techniques such as continuous integration, pair-
programming, test driven development, design patterns, code refactoring, unit testing, and 
other techniques during certified development? Which ones and what benefits does it 
provide over the conventional way?   
Any comments or challenges you would like to add in conclusion to this survey? 
